The Retirement Commissioner says that the government should resume contributions to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF). She says that the NZSF “…helps contribute to the long term affordability of [New Zealand Superannuation]…” The government agrees with the Retirement Commissioner – the only issue being when contributions should resume.
The NZSF was set up in 2001 to, in the words of then Finance Minister, Michael Cullen, “…smooth the future increase in the cost of superannuation over time”.
The NZSF will not reduce the future cost of NZS by one dollar – it may very partially ‘smooth’ the incidence of that cost but doesn’t change it. Re-starting the government’s contributions won’t change the cost; neither will a stellar nor a poor investment performance by the NZSF’s Guardians.
As stated in section 4 (How much will New Zealand Superannuation really cost?), the cost of any pension scheme, private or public, is the benefits actually paid by the scheme (plus administration costs) and that doesn’t have anything to do with how it is paid for. So, unless the NZS pension is to reduce, having the NZSF doesn’t change the economic implications of an ageing population. On current settings, the Treasury expects the cost of NZS to grow from a net 4.2% today to a net 7.1% by 2060. The NZSF does not affect those numbers.
Separately, the government has decided to reduce the value of NZS by shifting the pension age from 65 to 67 between 2037 and 2040; also by increasing the residence period from 10 to 20 years. The government estimates that would cut the cost of NZS by about 10% but, again, the presence or absence of the NZSF doesn’t change that number. Reducing the benefit is a separate issue so, for this discussion, let’s leave the benefit as it is.
The Treasury’s 2016 NZSF Contribution Rate Model assumes that the government restarts its contributions to the NZSF in 2021 (at nearly 1% of 2021 GDP or $3.05 billion); that the annual contribution will reduce over the years and will stop in 2035 after a further $27.7 billion has been contributed. That means taxes will need to be $27.7 billion higher than otherwise needed over the 15-year period.
When the drawdowns start in 2036, the total amount in the NZSF, in tomorrow’s money, will be about $150 billion, the equivalent of 25.5% of GDP in 2036 or roughly twice today’s amount in real terms.
 The Retirement Commissioner also recommended that the NZSF cease paying tax on its investment income “…while contributions are also suspended.” (2016 Review of Retirement Income Policies here at page 20. This is probably the worst reason to allow the NZSF to be tax-free and ignores the institutional effect of creating a tax-exempt investor, New Zealand’s largest investor, in New Zealand’s financial markets. We strongly disagree with this unsupported, throwaway recommendation (also made in the 2013 Review of Retirement Incomes here at page 56). The government, in its response to that recommendation of 7 June 2017 (accessible here) said “…the Government is still of the position that taxing the New Zealand Superannuation Fund investment returns provides better investment signals for those managing the Fund.” We agree.
 Letter from the Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs of 7 June 2017, accessible here. The letter says it “…is likely to be in 2020/21.”
 Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance, speech on the first reading of the New Zealand Superannuation Bill (2000) accessible here.
 The reduction will be 0.6% of GDP by 2040, according to Steven Joyce, Minister of Finance in a press release of 6 March 2017 Lifting NZ Super age the right thing to do, accessible here. Before the changes, the 2016 NZSF contribution model expected that the net cost of NZS in 2040 would be 6.0% of GDP; so 0.6% on 6.0% is one tenth of the cost.
 The Treasury’s 2016 NZSF Contribution Rate Model is accessible here. It takes no account of the 2037-2040 changes.
According to the Model, the maximum drawdown from the NZSF over the coming 100 years will be 1% of GDP or 12.5% of the net cost of NZS in 2079 and 2080. The simple average of 80 years’ drawdowns in the Model (2036-2116) is 0.66% of GDP a year or roughly 9.5% of the average net contemporary cost of NZS across the same period.
Most assume that the NZSF was intended to smooth the costs associated with retiring baby boomers but it is actually a ‘perpetuity’ fund. The Treasury’s Model shows that there will be more in the NZSF in real terms at the end of 100 years than there is today (31.2% of 2116 GDP compared with 12.3% today). So why precisely do we need such a fund? It will apparently still be with us long after the last of the baby boomers and their children has died.
The most that can be said about the NZSF is that it slightly changes the incidence of the cost of NZS but NZS, without the government’s benefit cuts, will cost the same. However, instead of asking tomorrow’s taxpayers to foot the full bill, today’s taxpayers are paying twice – once for today’s NZS and then extra to put in the NZSF. The Treasury’s Model suggests that today’s taxpayers will pay $3 billion more in 2021 (making 2021 taxes $86 billion rather than $83 billion) just so that taxes from 2036 onward will probably be slightly less for tomorrow’s taxpayers.
There is a lot wrong with the idea of partially pre-funding NZS - here are the main problems:
(a) Constrains tomorrow’s decision-makers: If we think NZS will be too expensive for tomorrow’s taxpayers without the NZSF then it should be their decision to cut benefits, not ours to constrain change (‘we baby boomers paid more taxes to protect our pension’). Adding the NZSF could be seen as an attempt by us to limit their ability to reduce future NZS pensions.
(b) 100% leveraged: Although the contributions to the NZSF came from higher taxes over the 2003-2009 period (not directly borrowed for the purpose) when we look at the money held in the NZSF from year to year, the argument changes. Investing in the presence of debt is exactly the same as borrowing to invest. In 2017, the government should treat every dollar in the NZSF as effectively a dollar borrowed. That’s because, at any time, it could sell those assets and repay debt. The government has effectively raised a mortgage of about $34.5 billion (April 2017) on New Zealand’s total assets (including the NZSF’s assets) to invest in financial markets. The return on the NZSF’s assets must at least equal the most expensive $34.5 billion of the government’s borrowings (the ‘hurdle rate’), plus the costs of running the NZSF, before there is any net gain to holding those assets rather than repaying the debt.
(c) Leverage magnifies risk: The investment risk is very high with a 100%-leveraged portfolio. Leverage magnifies both good and bad results. This is a financial risk that the government doesn’t have to take and shouldn’t. Unless the NZSF achieves a return that, over the long term is at least equal to the ‘hurdle rate’ then the presence of the NZSF will make NZS more expensive than its pure pay-as-you-go alternative. However, just achieving that hurdle rate is not enough. The risks associated with a 100%-leveraged portfolio also need to be paid for. In other words, the ‘hurdle rate’ should be risk-adjusted. While the NZSF may have its own internal measures of success, the government should separately calculate a risk-adjusted hurdle rate and publish that on a regular basis to justify, or not, the government’s policy decision to maintain the NZSF in the presence of debt. The NZSF should not do that calculation because it does not run the risks associated with missing the hurdle rate.
Just looking at the ‘equity risk premium’ or ERP and putting to one side the issue of 100% leverage, the government’s independent calculation of the ERP would put that at between 4 to 7.5 percentage points above the 10-year bond rate. The Treasury itself uses 4% in its assessment of the projected capital returns from the New Zealand Superannuation Fund. Most alternative measures would be higher than the NZSF’s own internal measures.
(d) Cookie jar economics: The NZSF is a good example of ‘cookie jar economics’ – if we tuck this money into a jar labelled ‘superannuation’, we can all save together for our collective retirement. For the reasons explained in section 4 (How much will New Zealand Superannuation really cost?), it’s not possible for a country to defer consumption or ‘save’ in this way. The government’s consolidated audited accounts put all of its financial activities into one spot. With the NZSF, the government’s financial statements for the period ending 30 April 2017 (accessible here) show that we taxpayers owe the rest of the world $62.7 bn. Without the NZSF cookie jar, that debt would be less than half. Having the cookie jar and higher debt does not improve New Zealanders’ future retirement income security which is normally the point of pre-funding.
(e) Total taxes higher over long-term: Long term, total taxes collected will probably be higher in the presence of the NZSF than if it had never started. We know that governments since 2001 have collected too much tax from us to pay for just NZS. Those excess taxes ($14.88 billion) currently sit in the NZSF together with investment income (less tax and expenses). The government says it wants to start collecting more excess tax from about 2021.
We need to anticipate what might happen when the capital drawdowns start. The Treasury’s Model suggests that the first payment from the NZSF in 2036 will be $118m or just 0.02% of GDP in that year. Those drawdowns will average 0.66% a year of nominal GDP in the 80 years between 2036 and 2116, the equivalent of about $1.75 billion in today’s terms. For tomorrow’s governments, that will look like ‘free’ money. Unless those governments make a conscious decision to reduce the overall tax take by the amount of the drawdowns, the economic underpinnings of the NZSF concept will disappear (higher taxes today for lower taxes tomorrow). Instead, total taxes will be higher over the long run in the presence of the NZSF.
 The NZSF itself compares its performance with 90-day Treasury bills (usually the government’s cheapest debt) and, separately, against “…the Treasury Bill return +2.7% p.a. over any 20-year moving period.” (see here). Neither of these adequately compensates taxpayers for the risks associated with a 100%-leveraged portfolio. The most recent pre-tax returns since inception (to 31 December 2016) are 10.04% p.a. (see here). The 90-day bill measure was 4.29% p.a. while the Treasury Bill + 2.7% comparator was 6.78% p.a. over the same period. We suggest that the achieved returns and the two comparators do not adequately compensate taxpayers for the risks.
 Bart Frijns in Equity Risk Premium (accessible here) suggests that the pre-tax ERP for a New Zealand portfolio should be 4.78%, based on share prices, dividend yields, inflation rates and 10-year government bond yields from 1899 to 2016. A post-tax ERP that the NZSF fund requires would be higher.
 The Market Equity Risk Premium (2005), The Treasury – accessible here.
 As already mentioned, the NZSF’s own internal “performance expectation is now NZ Treasury Bills + 2.7% pa” over a rolling 20 year period (see 2015 Reference Portfolio Review (2015) NZ SuperFund here). The Guardians also compare the NZSF’s performance against a self-constructed ‘Reference Portfolio’.
 Source: Undated Cabinet paper on New Zealand Superannuation from Minister of Finance of March 2017 para 67 at p. 9, accessible here.
There are other important, difficulties:
1. Deadweight cost of tax: Collecting taxes is not costless to the economy. Higher taxes (including higher taxes than are currently ‘needed’) impose indirect costs, such as the ‘dead-weight costs’ on the economy. People change their behaviour as a result of tax changes and that has a direct cost to the economy. Each extra dollar of tax has a measurable direct and indirect cost of collection to the economy. Those extra costs (amortised) should be added to the hurdle rate discussed in (c) above.
2. No domestic investments; no bonds: Investing domestically makes no economic sense for the NZSF and not much investment sense unless it leads to genuine higher economic growth. If the NZSF were all invested locally, its performance would echo the country’s economic performance. In an economic downturn, when everyone is tightening their belts, negative performances from the NZSF could put the security of NZS payments at risk and magnify the impact of the downturn. The NZSF should effectively be an insurance fund that offers some economic protection against New Zealand’s poor performance, relative to the rest of the world. This suggests that all investments should be overseas and none should be invested in fixed interest securities (because the money used for that investment is effectively all borrowed). At 30 April 2017, 15% of the investments were in New Zealand and 11% in fixed interest (see here).
3. No useful economic impact: The presence of the NZSF does not increase the capacity of the New Zealand economy to cope with larger numbers of ‘non-producers’ or to improve the affordability of tomorrow’s NZS. The presence of the NZSF can only be justified in this wider context (improving the sustainability of NZS) by increasing output, raising productivity or constraining the output of future workers (to make more consumption available to retirees and other non-workers). If it were entirely invested overseas, the NZSF cannot achieve any of those objectives.
4. Why pre-fund just pensions? There are no particular grounds for pre-funding NZS as opposed to pre-funding other government programmes like health, infrastructure, policing or the armed forces. What particularly is it about the age pension that deserves this special treatment?
5. Behavioural impact: New Zealanders may be negatively influenced in their own saving decisions by the presence of the NZSF. Its presence might suggest that New Zealanders do not have to save for retirement for themselves – the government is doing that for us all
Tomorrow’s taxpayers will (and should) decide on their government’s spending priorities that will, as now, balance all the different claims against revenues, electoral appeal etc. That will be the case for health, defence, policing, prisons, education and all of the government’s ‘other’ activities.
And that should also be the case for pensions, both to the old and to the dependent young.
Nothing that today’s taxpayers decide should interfere with that process in 2037 or 2060 – and it will not, even in the presence of the NZSF. That is the essential pointlessness of the NZSF which, if it achieves anything at all, will only get in the way of ‘sensible’, contemporary decisions.
Some might ask ‘what about intergenerational equity?’ The baby boomers have benefited from all kinds of things (education, jobs, housing, growth etc.) why shouldn’t they help pay for their own state pension through the build-up of the NZSF?
If there is anything in the partial pre-funding argument about intergenerational equity, that doesn’t apply to the NZSF. It is an ‘in-perpetuity’ fund so the higher taxes paid by baby boomers in the years to 2035 will be still there for the grandchildren of the baby boomers. As already mentioned, there will be more money in the NZSF, in real terms, in 100 years than there is today. The NZSF has nothing to do with intergenerational equity.
If effectively borrowing $34.5 billion (as of 30 April 2017) to invest in financial markets makes any economic sense then, rather than resuming contributions in three years or so, why doesn’t the government borrow another $34.5 billion today? We hope that’s a rhetorical question.
Instead of resuming contributions to the NZSF in 2021, we think the government should wind it up, sell the assets and repay $34.5 billion of its current $62.7 billion in debt (at 30 April 2017). That way, it will also save the $30.54 million in salaries and bonuses that the NZSF’s 115 staff received in 2016. They may have deserved those, but New Zealand really doesn’t need the NZSF.
We do not necessarily criticise the Guardians or the staff of the NZSF for the job they have done; we just suggest it’s a job they should not have been given.
 Estimates of the deadweight cost depend on the calculation basis used. In the Treasury’s Guide to Social Cost Benefit Analysis (July 2015, accessible here) at page 15, it observed that “Attempts have been made at estimating these effects, with estimates varying from 14% to more than 50% of the revenue collected…This guide suggests a rate of 20% as a default deadweight loss value in the absence of an alternative evidence based value. Thus public expenditures should be multiplied by a factor of 1.2 to incorporate the effects of deadweight loss.”
 Domestic equity-style investments could be justified only on the basis that they will add to New Zealand’s economic welfare by creating new jobs or improving productivity, not simply that it is a ‘sensible’ investment.
 Borrowing to invest in equities is risky but has a prospect of returning net gains over the cost of debt. That prospect is reduced or even eliminated if the borrowed money is used to invest in bonds.
 On similar grounds, there is no economic or fiscal point in pre-funding the Accident Compensation Corporation’s liabilities, nor for re-building the EQC Fund. On the ACC, see the RPRC’s PensionCommentary 2009-1 – Why does the Accident Compensation Corporation have a fund?, Michael Littlewood, accessible here. On the EQC, see the RPRC’s PensionCommentary 2011-1 – Why does the Earthquake Commission have a fund?, Michael Littlewood, accessible here.
 And asking New Zealanders what they think about the NZSF helps to politicise the issue. In A Practical Approach to Well-being Based Policy Development: What do New Zealanders Want from Their Retirement Income Policies? by Joey Au, Andrew Coleman and Trudy Sullivan (Treasury, 2015 accessible here), the authors found that, based on a survey of 1,066 New Zealanders, “…a policy that more aggressively prefunds New Zealand Superannuation by immediately raising taxes is supported by a majority of people of all ages and income groups.” From the report, we cannot tell precisely what questions induced this response but we can probably assume it did not include a statement along the lines that the NZSF that receives those higher taxes will not change the future cost of NZS by a dollar. As the report itself says, “One issue that underlies the whole survey is framing. It is well known that the way questions are framed can have an enormous effect on survey responses.” (at page 12).
 Employee salary data and employee numbers from the Annual Report 2016 (accessible here) at pages 162 and 67.
New Zealand needs a complete and independent review of the underpinning logic of the NZSF’s existence. How precisely does higher government debt and associated financial assets improve the security of future superannuitants’ pensions? What risks might this strategy involve? How should those risks be priced?